Let’s talk about capacity

How many aircraft a runway or an ATC can handle per hour or per any amount of time is a key piece of information that every ATC and ANSP should know.

Capacity has its own chapter in ICAO doc 4444 where it says The number of aircraft provided with an ATC service shall not exceed that which can be safely handled by the ATC unit concerned under the prevailing circumstances. In order to define the maximum number of flights which can be safely accommodated, the appropriate ATS authority should assess and declare the ATC capacity for control areas, for control sectors within a control area and for aerodromes.”

This of course makes a lot of sense and sounds very easy that an ATC service shall handle only the amount of traffic that can safety handle. But how is this number obtained?

Different states and ANSP have different ways of calculating and expressing capacity, but they all share some same principles.


They all recognize that there are at least, some group of variables that will affect the Runway or Sector Capacity and these are shown in ICAO DOC 9971:

Capacity output

Once the variables have been qualitatively identified, it is time to transform them into qualitative values… but what is our desired output?

Skybrary speaks about three main methods to describe a sector’s capacity:

  • Entry counts: Capacity is expressed in maximum aircraft that are handled per time unit, usually one hour (e.g. 30acft/hour)
  • Frequency occupancy: Capacity is expressed in maximum number of aircraft on the frequency (e.g. 20 acft at the same time)
  • Controller workload: This method is based on an assessment of how much time the controller needs to perform all necessary tasks.

 Which one is the best? There is no single right answer; that will depend on what one is looking for and the operational context.

Capacity Calculation

Once we know the variables and our desired output, we can perform our capacity calculation.

Again there are several methodologies to perform capacity calculations, where some are based on recollection of data on the operation such as sector flight times, frequency times, etc., others are based on running fast time simulations and others in using simplified methods for faster results.

An analogy could be made with the validation process for a new airspace:

Next Steps

I have calculated my capacity! What now?

Having calculated your capacity is only the first step. It is important to keep in mind the number and the variables as it is not a fixed value and it might change during the operation.

There are several actions that can be performed once capacity has been calculated, but probably the most common one is to compare it against the predicted demand and, if it is detected that demand will be greater than the capacity, take some actions to further increase the capacity or to regulate the demand.

Of course, there are many other actions and assessments that can be performed, but for sure having this value is required.


At INGENAV we can help you with:

  • Runway and ATC Sector Capacity Assessments
  • Runway and ATC Sector Training
  • Runway and ATC Capacity Consultancy

Moreover, Ingenav is certified in ISO 9001:2015 for Design and Delivery of Training in Air Navigation and  Consulting in Air Navigation as well as is a Training Organization for Air Traffic Control training in accordance with EU regulation 340-2015.

The importance of Quality for Air Navigation Service Providers

“My service has the best quality”, “We offer the best quality service to our customers”, “Our service is guaranteed by quality”. Have you ever heard that? Most probably you have. Quality is a word that we hear in everyday and in relation to many different fields, from buying a new TV, hiring a new internet provider, or even playing sports.

What about the Air Navigation Industry? Quality of service has been a subject for several years now and perhaps more related with Aeronautical Information Management (AIM), Safety Management Systems (SMS) and Flight Procedures Design (FPD), not to mention Service Level Agreements (SLA), but is that all?

Let’s develop a little further:

What is Quality?

Even though there are many definitions for Quality, a good starting point would be ISO’s definition:

“Degree to which a set of inherent characteristics of an object fulfils requirements.”

This means that quality depends on the requirements of what is intended to be done (Good or Service) and how we achieve these requirements. This simple sentence implies a lot, and it brings the possibility to plan, do, check, act, and plan again to fulfil our goal.



Process in Quality

Basically, a process are series of actions or steps taken to achieve a particular end.

In this way of thinking there are 3 basic phases:

  • Input: Where the goods, data, service or whatever we need to produce are collected
  • Process: Where the input is transformed into something new
  • Output: Where the final product is presented


Let’s explore examples of this in Air Navigation Services:

  • Aerodrome data is surveyed by using its own process. The data collected (output).
  • This output will be an input for AIS/AIM where a new AIP will be made.
  • The new AIP will be a new input for Flight Procedure Designers which will produce as an output a new Procedures and Charts.
  • This Procedures and Charts will be loaded into Aircraft’s FMS and ANSP’s ATM Systems.

This chain of inputs and outputs looks perfect in theory but what would happen if one piece of data Aerodrome data surveyed had a mistake and was not detected?

Garbage In Garbage Out

There is a concept mainly used in IT which states that the quality of the input determines the quality of the output. In other words, the quality coming out is dependent on the quality of the input.

The importance of this concept remains in that what we do in Air Navigation Services has direct impact on the Safety of the Operations.

Keeping Operations Safe

There are many documents from different organizations about how safety is achieved, but they all agree on that Quality is required for a Safety Management System to work properly.

One of the most famous models used in safety is James Reason’s Swiss Cheese model.

In the Swiss Cheese model, an organisation’s defences against failure are modelled as a series of barriers, represented as slices of the cheese.

The holes in the cheese slices represent individual weaknesses in individual parts of the system and are continually varying in size and position in all slices.

The system produces failures when holes in all of the slices momentarily align, permitting “a trajectory of accident opportunity”, so that a hazard passes through holes in all of the defences, leading to an accident.

Usually, an organisation’s defences can be described in 3 categories:

  • Technology
  • Procedures
  • Human Competence

This defences work as an input for the safety process, therefor it is fundamental to have an excellent quality on them.

How can an ANSP make sure that their input for safety will have the required quality

There are 2 basic ways:

  • If Technology, Competence acquisition (training) or Procedures are contracted from another provider, make sure that the provider has at least an ISO 9001 certification and not only a “generic” specification but with a specific mention in the required process.
  • If Technology, Training or Procedures will be performed in house, have these process certified.

INGENAV and Quality Certification

Ingenav has been certified in ISO 9001:2015 for its quality management system since 2016, and not just certified in a general way, but specifically in:

  • Design and Delivery of Training in Air Navigation
  • Consulting in Air Navigation

This means that what INGENAV does, regarding Training and Consultancy, has Certified Quality and will fulfil the customer’s requirements.

Moreover, since 2018 Ingenav is also certified as a Training Organisation for Air Traffic Control training in accordance with EU regulation 340-2015.


Air Navigation Services ORAT: Operational Readiness and Transition

What is an ORAT?

Changes bring opportunities but they also bring risks. In safety and time critical environments, these risks, if unmanaged, can have very serious consequences.

Operational Readiness and Transition (ORAT) is a methodology that provides a framework for managing the risk that changes bring with it, be it due to changes in facilities, configuration or procedures. This methodology also aims at harnessing the opportunities that the same changes bring. ORAT is a methodology highly used in changes affecting airport operations. It can equally be applied to other changes in the aviation industry such as those affecting Air Navigation Services.

A typical project focus is on construction delivery and completion of a static asset (cost, time and quality), operational readiness is focused on the dynamic state of a business operation, integrating all of the diverse moving parts into one, cohesive, dynamic operation.

An ORAT is used mainly because it:

Ensures smooth start / transition of operations.

• Provides controlled and managed planning, preparation and execution of operational readiness processes.

Integrates all stakeholders (air navigation services (management and staff), airport operations, regulation and certification, airlines, handling, etc.) 

Ensures buy-in and safe and efficient process

ORAT Components

Every project is different; however usually an ORAT will have the following elements:

ORAT Components
ORAT Components

It is important to remark that each of these elements has a purpose in the ORAT process and it should be properly handled.

Also, an ORAT will require excellent coordination between Operational, Technical and Safety/Regulatory parties.

Human Centric Approach

We believe that the best way of doing an ORAT is keeping in mind that Humans are always a key part, as we are the ones who are involved in every operation.

The various ORAT sub-phases such as Concept, Procedures, Safety, Training, Shadowing have also the objective of permitting the main actors (e.g. Management, Operations, Engineering, Safety Management, Regulatory Oversight, etc.) to gain confidence in the system, therefore, increasing the acceptance of the system as a whole and increasing the chances of a successful transfer of knowledge.

ORATs aim not only to prepare everything for operations but also to transfer essential knowledge on procedures, training and safety management as well as transition management to the staff during the process.

INGENAV we are confident that when a big change will happen, an ORAT is a key element for a successful transition into the new operation environment.

We base this on our knowledge and in our experience of previous projects where with the use of ORAT, successful implementations have taken place.


Presenting Ingenav´s Competence Management software module

During these past years, we have been working towards a software suite aimed at supporting air navigation services providers in the management of air traffic controllers and their needs. We are calling this suite ARM for Air traffic controllers Resources Management.

In 2020 we launched our Roster Management module as the first module within ARM. Now we are launching the second module in the suite: the Competence Management module.  Our idea is that each module in the suite is interlinked with the others and fed by one powerful database which would store and distribute all the information pertaining to air traffic controllers. Clients can choose to opt for the complete suite or for distinct modules within it. The formula is flexible.

The Competence Management module allows ANSPs to monitor and manage the competence elements that are present in every ATCO license. The database includes space to incorporate all the elements that are present in a license, such as the ratings, endorsements, etc. and all the elements that enable these endorsements to stay up to date, for example, dates for competence assessments, dates for refresher training, medical examinations, etc.

The administrator of the module will receive warnings, which are parametrisable by the client, notifying that an element needs attention. These warnings can be kept for the attention of the administration or forwarded to the ATCO in a workflow. ATCOs can be given access to the Competence Management module so as to view the information and to also be presented with information pertaining to the status of the components making up their ATC license. The workflow arrangement between administration and the individual controller, which is purely parametrisable as well, would depend on how each ANSP would like to use the Competence Management module. 

Finally, the module also comes with a powerful search function which would allow the ANSP, to plan ahead by launching queries, for example: “How many ATCOs I have that have their English proficiency expiring in the 1st quarter of next year?” or “How many ATCOs are due for their OJTI refresher by a specific time?”, etc.

We think that the Competence Management module is of great add-value to ANSPs and the feedback we are receiving confirms this.

A link to a demo video that we have prepared is embedded in this post.

We are also offering one-on-one online demonstrations of the module. We would be glad to hold one with you – contact us via Linkedin private messaging or via info@ingenav.com.

And one more thing; we are maintaining “covid sensitive” prices for the launching of this module.


Automation and training

Automation in air traffic control (ATC) has been on a steady rise for a very long time now. We moved from no surveillance, to primary and then to secondary surveillance. From paper writing the flight details to printable strips, to electronic strips and to label based information. From no integration between plots and flight data to a high integration and trajectory prediction. From no ATC support control tools to short-term and then medium-term conflict detection, to probing and what-if tools. And this rise of automation will continue and will accelerate.

Early generation automation provided controllers with information acquisition (e.g., secondary radar display), then came automation that provided analysis, such as the probing mentioned earlier. Higher processing capabilities as well as the use of big data will allow us to see incursions into higher-end automation in the coming years. ATC systems will start providing decision suggestions that can be implemented by the controllers. Later we will also see some actions being implemented by the system. All this will come.

However, automation will not replace air traffic controllers, at least for a considerable long while. What it will do is augment the system capability to safely handle more traffic. We talk about human-centric automation, where automation will be used to enhance the capabilities and compensate for the limitations of air traffic controllers who will remain responsible for the safety and effectiveness of a complex ATC system. This will mean that on the one hand automation will need to be implemented to actually help humans and that the total sum of work, in terms of complexity and volume should at least remains stable, and on the other, that the system will need to be redesigned to allow for this enhanced human-machine interaction.

What I am referring to when I write about system redesign is to rethink not only the machine´s new role into the system but also the human´s. What are the skills, knowledge and attitude that will be needed in a high-end automatised system? What will be expected during normal operations and then during contingency operations? And then, with regards to skills: what skills will be needed in both situations and at what level? And what skills will be needed by controllers during contingency situations that are not used anymore during normal situations? And how will we mitigate to maintain a certain skill proficiency?

Some speak about the automation paradox which says something like that the increase in automation will bring an increase in human workload. I honestly do not understand why they call it a paradox unless those who do so have a misunderstanding that the human will do nothing thanks to automation and will be phased out. If one simplistically sees the objective of automation as to phase out humans, then yes, I understand they might see this as a paradox! But the aim of automation is not (or should not be) that. The objective of automation should be to allow a system such as the air traffic management one, to cater for more capacity, whilst maintaining very high levels of safety, stability and resilience. The goal should be that the system performs better with the best team of resources possible, and that team will include humans for quite a long while.

Many adaptations will be needed to have all this possible. Contingency procedures will need to be re-written, for one, and the role of training will also need to evolve, and that is the theme of this post.

One area that needs to be considered in-depth, with the dawn of decision support and decision implementation, is skill degradation. Currently, decisions are made up by the controller, based on automation-supported information. In the future, some (or many) decisions will be proposed by the system to be implemented by the controller, and/or some decisions will be implemented by the system, and the human might be expected to take over at least as a first contingency level, should the system fail. It is already hard to do this with the current skill set, let alone with one which is degraded because unused. So, what could be done? Let us look at another situation where skills have not been used for a while and how many air navigations services provider (ANSPs) have dealt with that degradation:

During the current COVID pandemic, traffic went from an all-time high to an all-time low. After an initial shock, many ANSPs decided to implement “skill-up” programmes for their controllers. These consisted of regularly planning controllers into simulation sessions of traffic loads and complexity similar to pre-pandemic levels. This is currently mitigating somewhat to the lack of skill practice in operations due to lack of traffic.

One of the things that could and in my opinion should be done, with the dawn of decision and implementation support by the machine is to regularly plan our controllers for simulation sessions in which they would need to practice their decision-making skills. Regular practice in the simulation would somewhat mitigate the skill loss in operations.

Refresher training in the simulator should be transformed from the currently abnormal and emergency situation centred one to one in which decision making is practised with lower degrees of automated support in both routine and non-routine situations. Also, the decision-making skill maintenance training would need to be done more often than the usual once every year refresher that is mostly the case nowadays. It should be something that becomes a routine and part of the monthly rostering of positions: many operational duties mixed with some simulation, skill maintenance duties. Simulation should become more routine than once a year event.

Some might see this thought as counterintuitive (or a paradox), and expensive. However, it is not so as the benefits of automation will be such that the system will considerably gain in capacity and efficiency. Some of that will need to be retro-alimented back to those who will need to maintain their skill set to be a highly effective part of the system. It´s a bit like in soccer, or other sports, where the team is not only made up of the 11 on the pitch but also, amongst others, of the other 5 on the substitute bench during the match. These players do not train less because they are playing less. They will train just the same as their teammates, and if anything, even train more, to make for the lack of match practice! And no one I know calls that a paradox!

Instructor Booster workshops – Now also online.

A few years ago, I was contacted by an ATC academy with a request to help them with a number of objectives which included:

  • forging a stronger instructor´ team,
  • go beyond the minimum knowledge required (usually the instructor endorsement and classroom instructions techniques) and
  • to reflect on best-fit training delivery methods.

I then set out to create a workshop with these objectives in mind.

Now, we are fours years down the line, with eight of such workshops delivered to four European ATC schools. Five further workshops are already planned for between the end of this year and 2021.

The workshops are a mixture of facilitated sessions and presentations in which we go through a simple, but effective, model that says that to consider learning we need to consider 4 areas: Who, What, How and By Whom.

The who is the student, who has a need to learn, the What is the subject matter – or content, the How is the methodology and methods used and the By Whom is, of course, us the instructors/teachers/coaches.

We go through a reflective path to consider all these elements as the basic ingredients that make up a plate. One can say that there are as many learning experiences as there are plates and the trick is to dose the basic ingredients right. However, as anyone who has attempted a little bit of cooking knows, before dosing an ingredient, one needs to know what it tastes like and what effect it´s presence (or absence) and quantity will produce in the plate.

The results help those attending, who range from instructors to training managers and those responsible for training development to reflect about the fit of the learning experience to the ingredients they have: the type of students and the subject matter. It helps them think on whether adjustments to the methodology and methods are necessary and finally to determine their own needs to be an integral part of the recipe.

The feedback received is very positive. We step down the hamster wheel called routine (no wonder that in many languages routine (from road) and wheel are related) and start reflecting on what is working and what can be improved. We come out of the workshop with insight into our work and our needs as instructors. We also come out with concrete ideas on how and where to make adjustments.

This year brought a new challenge: These workshops were until now held in a face to face set up with a lot of team exercises and dynamics. With restrictions in meeting and in travelling, we had to take a decision to either postpone the planned workshops, and lose good time when actually reflection and change COULD take place, or find another solution. We decided to go online. We had to consider the number of participants and also most of the exercises and the dynamics in which they are done. The first such workshop took place a week ago with very good results!

As for me, each workshop is a learning experience. I do provide my ideas through the presentations and also challenge the status quo. I also learn a lot, from the day to day examples, from the insight that my fellow instructors provide and also come out energised ready to do more to improve the learning experience in our business!

Diversity of perspective – safety and team resources management

There are at least three types of truths –

Alternative truths: (actually “alternative facts”) a term coined by a US counsellor and synonym with “fake news”,

Objective truths: that deal with things that can be objectively measured against an agreed standard and therefore the result either is or is not – for example, 5NM separation minimum either is or is not if measured by a well-calibrated mode. And

Subjective truths: those things that are true (or false) to us because we analyse them against what we know, how we experience what happened and against our values and believes. For example,  from where I stand it is true to me that the sun is a sphere of white/yellow colour which emits both light and heat.

The focus of this post is on subjective truth and diversity of perspectives:

A subjective truth, as the term entails, is true to the subject experiencing it. Someone close to the north pole, who has not had access to any scientific explanation of what the sun is, could say that the sun is a yellow circle that appears on the horizon and which emits light. Both this person and I hold an experience of what the sun is, and no one can tell us that what we experience is untrue – even though objectively the sun has other characteristics that neither I nor this person can experience and therefore describe as part of their truth.

Now, bringing this thought to air traffic control, where our job is primarily to achieve and maintain objective truths such as minimum safety standards, I believe that sometimes we mix up what is objectively a fact and the subjective truths we derive from experiencing situations1. We forget that in the realm of subjective truths, these truths can vary to a large degree between peers and we also forget that the aim is not to debate on who is right or wrong – which makes no sense, but to sum up these truths to make up something richer.

Put in another way, when we experience something, we all get a perspective of that event, based on our prior knowledge, our values and believes and our position relative to the event. A team is stronger to analyse a particular event because the diversity of perspective that a team has is richer than the mono-perspective of each of the individuals. This diversity of perspective then helps us to make better sense of the situation, it enables learning between the individuals and improves decision making.

So where does Team Resources Management fit into all of this?

The way TRM is delivered, through facilitated sessions around, for example, exercise or case studies, allows those who participate to get off the “act” – “react” loop of ATC and delve into more of introspection of the experiences which mark differences in one´s professional career. It creates, to those participating, an environment of sharing in which all perspectives are valued. The results of this are at least two-fold: First, it allows us to realise once more that our experiences lie in the realm of subjective (and not objective) truths, and that several versions do exist and all are valid. Second, that when the subject in discussion in a TRM session arrives at items very close to our operational home, it gives us the diversity of perspective that is one of the main enablers for learning and for a richer (call it augmented) experience of the professional world around us.

Needless to say, that this richness derived from diversity of perspective will, in turn, improve the safety in our teams, as our teams are then wiser about the particular subject of discussion and from the knowledge that a team holds more pieces of the puzzle than the individual usually has.


that experience can be either a direct or an indirect one.

Why do we investigate?

The no-prize answer is ‘because we have to’. The correct one is because we cannot afford not to.

ICAO Annex 13 lays out the consolation that ‘the sole objective of the investigation of an […] incident shall be the prevention of […] incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability’. The tangible outcome of an incident investigation is the Investigation Report housing sections on Factual Information, Analysis, and Conclusions. It only stands to reason that Factual Information has to be obtained and suitably analysed for conclusions be drawn as to WHAT actually happened, and WHY it happened. Now comes the sticky part, for the Investigator is also tasked with coming up with Safety Recommendations. I admit that, as an Incident Investigator, I have often slept uneasy over this last responsibility. I have gathered and examined written and verbal reports, I have listened to voice recordings and transcribed them, I have watched the video recordings of the occurrence or the radar screen as well as the relative keyboard inputs, I have interviewed all involved and obtained as much information as to what was happening. I have made myself familiar with all the circumstances at the time. Armed with all available data, I have absolutely no problem with reaching conclusions about causal and contributing factors. On these I am now an authority. But to make recommendations? I look back to the courses I attended, and the training seminars I endured (and lately made others endure), and note with disappointment that this ultimate ‘must do’ has, all-too-often, been very much glossed over. We make it sound as if coming up with recommendations is simply a natural follow-up to all the digging made, and these will simply fall into the lap of the deserving. The bad news is that this is far from it.

I can put suggestions on how to right obvious shortcomings; I can also extrapolate the actual happening to include ‘what if’ scenarios and decide if the available procedures or resources carry enough resiliency. But I have, at times, felt insufficiently equipped to confidently reassure myself that I have covered all possible recommendations. Is it enough to point out that inappropriate phraseology was a contributing factor to a runway incursion? Or, that better employment of speed control could have averted an unwholesome situation? Or, that letters of agreement between sectors do not cover all eventualities? I question myself, should I spell out a recommendation that personnel attend mandatory phraseology or speed control refresher training? Or oblige the powers that be to revisit procedures? What if I overlook a recommendation which could avert another incident in the future? Should I conscientiously take responsibility for my recommendations to not adversely impact my company financially? Should I even be questioning myself about such? Uneasy is the head that wears the headset marked Incident Investigator.

Making recommendations is an onerous responsibility. A medical doctor, having examined the patient and carried out the required tests, writes out the appropriate chemicals to be ingested to right the ailment. The Investigator prescribes appropriate remedial attention to avert a repetition of an unpleasant happening. The patient implicitly puts his trust in the good doctor and happily downs pink capsules before meals; the system trusts the recommendations to be the best cure to a malady. The recommendations being delivered, the ANSP decides if they should be implemented: whether in their entirety or in part, the method and the timing. The Investigator’s report is only testament to her findings coupled with her experience; it is the ANSP’s call to implement the corrections. The entity is answerable to its clients, its professionals, and the overseeing Authority.

Approaching summer of 2020, we are in a shell-shocked state. We do not know what the postdiluvian world will look like. Regarding Investigator training, we have, in recent years, witnessed the progressive reduction of the instruction and practice period. One can only assume these will be decreased even further. e-TOKAI* has wonderfully enabled the reporting and investigation process to be conveniently wrapped up in a seamless package with a deliverable document rolling out at the other end. The Tool has taken out the hassle and intricacies of building a report while ensuring that all possible data is collected. Investigation reports have become more standardised, coherent and thorough. e-TOKAI sees to that. Sadly, the free-text areas can be more disappointing. Investigator training, even more limited as it might evolve, will continue to train candidates in data gathering, interviewing techniques and gaining personnel trust, but more consideration should be given to the quality of report writing.

Writing reports is an art form. The writer has to keep the intended consumer in mind. The report culminates in the Recommendations area, and the Investigator has to ‘sell’ her recommendations in the most convincing manner. A badly structured report will not inspire a sale, and a badly written one will only alienate its audience, rendering the exercise futile.

At the end of a report come the recommendations. Mine is to revisit the Investigator training material, give e-TOKAI its room to do what it does best, and better employ time and resources to train our professionals to construct better reports and put forward meaningful recommendations.

We cannot afford otherwise.

* e-TOKAI is Eurocontrol´s toolkit for air traffic management occurrence investigation.

Renald Galea is an Air Traffic Controller with vast experience as an Incident Investigator and the use of e-TOKAI and RAT.

Supporting ATC students during COVID pandemic – Ingenav´s experience

At the beginning of April, we put up announcements on Linked-in and Facebook offering help with theory and or radar techniques to students who had their training interrupted because of the COVID pandemic. This help would be delivered for free as part of our initiative to help our sector in times of need.

Surprisingly for us, only a few students contacted us for help and they needed reinforcement in practical skills training.

During the months of April and May, we remotely delivered Approach and En-Route Surveillance skills training using PORT – ROSE Simulation Online ATC Simulator platform and our own exercises. Our instructors ran over 50 exercises with these students, adapted to their level of proficiency and helping them to maintain the skills they had learned already in their schools and to learn certain new ones.

From our side, we learned better how to deliver skills training remotely. We have learned that whereas face to face contact and feedback helps in certain cases, it is not necessary 100% of the time. A blend of presential and remote/online skills training is possible. We learned that briefings and debriefings are perfectly possible in an online space and that today the technology to execute and remotely monitor a student during simulation is perfectly possible and highly performant.

From the feedback we received at the end of these sessions, we see that the students, apart from being very appreciative of the gesture, they valued the following in particular:

  • The fact that someone else was giving a parallel and fresh viewpoint on problem-solving and radar skills, that complemented that which was thought in their school.
  • They could experiment outside of their official school program. Experimentation included: different separation techniques (vectors, vertical with rates of climb/descent, etc. ), coordination techniques, analysis of aircraft performance within the decision-making process, coordination, approaches including ILS and visual approaches.
  • Students did not find not having face-to-face interaction with the instruction a hindrance to their development.
  • The empathy and availability of the instructor during these difficult times was what they were looking for.
  • The possibility to continue practising radar skills and to avoid or at least reduce skill degradation.

In conclusion, offering free ATC training during the COVID pandemic has been a very positive experience for us at Ingenav, and from the feedback, we received a positive experience for the students who participated. Large amounts of ATC practical training can be done remotely. The technology permits it and the methodology fits well. We are considering repeating this at a later stage!

Automation and Human Centricity – Three-tier human centricity. Position paper.

There should be little doubt or argument that the journey towards further automation in Air Traffic Control is well on its way and is set to continue. Also, there is little doubt that many of the future solutions will have, at least, some of their components based on Artificial Intelligence techniques.

If we look at SESAR´s Level of Automation Taxonomy (LOAT) model as displayed below,  

most modern ATC Systems are somewhere between B4/B5: High level – full automation support of information analysis and C1: Artefact-supported Decision Making.

The end goal for most R&D projects is to arrive to D8: Full automation of action sequence execution for all ATC tasks.

This raises a few items to consider and this is what we at Ingenav think about this:

  1. Until D8 is reached on all ATC tasks (whether it will be desirable for it to be reached is the subject of item 2), humans will be part of the system and the system will need to be Human-Centric.
  2. It is questionable whether, even if technologically possible, it would be desirable to reach D8 and have a non-human-in-the-system ATC chain.

Developing these items, a little further we need to consider:

  1. A three-tier Human-Centric approach is necessary:

Human-Centricity needs to be seen holistically:

The design of an ATC system needs to be done through a human-centric approach. The result, i.e. the ATC system itself needs to be human-centric. And with the growing autonomy coming about, one shall not forget that the end-user of ATC is not the air traffic controller but the airspace user: the human who flies the aircraft. These are the three tiers – from the design, to the product itself, to its output.

Starting from Tier 3: Human-Centric design:

The design of an ATC system shall be led by its usability and by its interaction with the holistic system first. Rather than having a technology-led design in which the “what can be done” is defined first and the “how” is done later, human-centric design requires agile development cycles between definition – prototyping – human in the system testing – adjustments – redefinition and advancements. The design team needs to incorporate from a very early stage operational expertise that understands the business and the process and that co-lead the design. This should be the case even when the functionalities that are being developed would be in the high Ds in accordance with LOAT as these will always interact with other processes where the human is involved.

Tier 2: Human-Centric system:

The result of the design – i.e. the product, needs to fully integrate the human as part of the system and not its operator or the mortar which glues together the imperfections created by the other parts. A Human-Centric system understands how the human works and integrates the human´s processes into the overall system. Principles such as relevance, timeliness, prioritized and rationalized for human understanding should be key in all the interactions of a human-centric system.

Tier 1: Human-Centric outputs:

It may sound obvious but it is often taken for granted: an ATC system acts as an intermediate; it is a safety net and an efficiency boost to air traffic and airspace users (that is the objective of ATC!). It is airspace users who execute the instructions generated by ATC. Until further notice, aircraft will be flown by humans. The instructions provided by ATC need to keep that in mind. So far, this has been taken for granted because the human-in-the-system at the ATC level automatically made the adjustment. However, in a scenario where some of the instructions are not generated by a human, the system has to keep in mind they will be executed by one.

It is important to insist on Human-Centricity and the human-in-the-system principle and not to see the human as an external agent who acts as an operator or a mediator, or even worse as a corrector of imperfections. It is important to take the learnings we have made in the past decades and build on them rather than to try to discard them because we believe that advanced automation will make the human somehow less important.

Question 2: is it desirable to arrive to D8?

The quick answer to this is that we don´t know. To date, we do not have the maturity to understand what a fully autonomous system, which in turn is an intermediate between vigilance and execution, would mean. The gap to get there is still too big and we need to narrow this gap in order to understand better the ramifications. Of the ramifications, we are able to identify to date one can include resilience, of such a system and degraded modes, interconnectiblity, responsibility, certification, the holistic concept of operations of the airspace user and societal (is it, in fact, desirable and productive from a societal perspective to try to eliminate the human from the system?).

R&D in this area must continue and needs to be holistic and not just technology-driven. We can do a lot of things but should we apply them? By continuing R&D, the sector will mature further and whilst bridging the gap, we will also understand the opportunities and the threats that such changes would bring. If we ever reach D8, it should be an evolution and not a revolution.


Undoubtedly, work is in progress towards advanced automation in the lines of decision-making support and basic autonomous execution of tasks. Human-Centricity is primordial in the development of such tools and this human-centricity needs to be taken care of in 3-tiers: at design, at the system and at output levels. Achieving D8: full automation of task execution for all tasks making up ATC should be an R&D goal and not an operational one at this stage. The gap between the current paradigm and that one is too wide and we do not have the maturity to understand the ramifications of such a change. R&D needs to be holistic and not just technology-driven. A stepwise approach towards understanding will be necessary.


PS Ingenav is currently participating in a project with a Core European ANSP and ATC system manufacturer to introduce Decision Support Operational ATC tools using amongst other historical data and machine learning principles. In this project, a 3-tier Human-Centric approach is being applied.